strategy for a brand name drug is typically affected by generic entry. However, little is known about how newer strategies to extend patent life, including product reformulation introduction or obtaining approval to market for additional clinical indications, influence promotion. Objective: To examine the relationships among promotional expenditures, generic entry, reformulation entry and new indication approval. Methods: We used quarterly data on national product-level promotional spending (including expenditures for physician detailing and direct-to-consumer advertising [DTCA], and the retail value of free samples distributed in physician offices) for selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) over the period 1997-2004. We estimated econometric models of detailing, DTCA and total quarterly promotional expenditures as a function of the timing of generic entry, entry of new product formulations and US FDA approval for new clinical indications for existing medications in the SSRI class. Expenditures by pharmaceutical manufacturers for promotion of antidepressant medications was the main outcome measure.
before generic entry shifted most promotion dollars from the original brand to the reformulation long before generic entry, and in some cases manufacturers appeared to target a particular promotion type for a given indication. Given the significant impact that pharmaceutical promotion has on demand for prescription drugs in the US, these findings have important implications for prescription drug spending and public health.
spending by SSRI manufacturers. We also explore lar entities). Pharmaceutical firms may obtain the timing of new product entry and subsequent 3 years of additional exclusivity for new indications promotional strategies.
or formulations. The introduction of new product formulations and applications for approval for new indications have become increasingly common in Unique Characteristics of the recent years, yet the implications for promotional Pharmaceutical Industry spending for the originator product and the new formulation are unknown. The market for pharmaceuticals has a number of Finally, marginal production costs for many predistinct characteristics from other markets that have scription drugs are very low, literally 'pennies a important implications for explaining spending on pill'. An implication of this is that any promotional promotional activities. First, consumers must obtain activities that generate more sales than their promoa physician's prescription in order to buy most phartion and relatively small marginal production costs maceuticals. The importance of physician decision will be profitable for a manufacturer whose product making in pharmaceutical markets is underscored is patent protected. by the fact that almost 60% of the combined promotional expenditures are aimed at physicians. [12] Theoretical Considerations A second distinguishing feature of the market for pharmaceuticals is that, like most healthcare services, the majority of prescription drug expenditures
In their classic paper on optimal advertising, are paid for by third-party insurers. Currently, nearly Dorfman and Steiner [18] showed that the optimal all (98%) covered workers in employer-sponsored advertising-to-sales ratio for a profit-maximizing health insurance plans in the US have prescription monopolist facing a downward-sloping linear dedrug benefits. [13] Prescription drug benefits are also mand curve is equal to the ratio of the elasticity of covered under Medicaid and Medicare (as of 2006). demand with respect to advertising and the (absolute In 2002, third-party payers accounted for 70% of value of the) elasticity of demand with respect to prescription drug expenditures. [14] In recent years, price. Although the Dorfman-Steiner theorem asinsurers/pharmacy benefit managers have sought to sumes that advertising lasts only one time period, it encourage use of lower cost generics as well as can be generalized to a dynamic model where the stimulate price competition among brand name effects of advertising are long lived and persist into drugs through the use of tiered or incentive-based the future. [19] formularies. [15] Incentive-based formularies have
The Dorfman-Steiner result implies that the marbeen shown to reduce demand for drugs placed on ginal profitability from advertising increases as the the highest copay tier by 22-65%, depending on the price elasticity of demand for the good falls (in therapeutic class of drugs. [16] absolute value). An implication of this theorem for These two demand-side characteristics interact pharmaceutical markets is that the optimal level of with a third important characteristic of prescription advertising intensity will decline with generic entry. drug markets, the presence of monopoly power on When generic equivalents enter the market, the nuthe supply-side, to support prices that well exceed merator of the ratio (the elasticity of demand with marginal production costs. [17] Monopoly power is respect to advertising) is expected to decrease, beconferred by patent protection, which makes it ille-cause of the potential spillover of any branded progal for any other company to sell the same drug motional efforts onto the generic alternative. At the between the time the FDA approves a drug and same time, the denominator of the ratio (the price when its patent expires (or is deemed invalid). The elasticity of demand) is expected to increase, as Hatch Waxman Act extended the duration of exclu-generic entry allows a set of nearly perfect substisive marketing rights (known as exclusivity) to tutes into the market. As a result, the Dorfmanpharmaceutical manufacturers for a period of ≥5 and Steiner theorem implies that the optimal advertis-≤14 years from FDA approval date for new drugs ing-to-sales ratio for a brand name drug facing ge-(referred to as new chemical entities or new molecu-neric competition will decrease. The Dorfman-Steiner theorem describes the opti-itors reached ten. Similarly, in an analysis of 98 mal level of total promotional expenditures relative drugs that lost patent protection between 1986 and to sales. However, it does not shed light on the 1992, Scott-Morton [22] found that the amount of optimal ratios of different types of promotional time on patent was strongly negatively correlated spending. Palda [20] showed that, when there are sev-with expenditures on detailing and journal advertiseral types of promotional instruments and constant ing, meaning that the longer a drug had been on the unit promotional costs, the optimal ratio of spending market the less was spent on promotion. for any two types of promotion equals the ratio of In a study of the product-and market-level detertheir promotional elasticities. Thus, generic entry minants of spending on DTCA, Iizuka [9] examined a should result in proportional declines in all forms of total of 606 drug-year observations for 169 unique promotion intensity.
brand name CNS agents, respiratory agents and renal and genitourinary agents over the period 1996 Prior Empirical Literature on through 1999. He found that the number of branded Pharmaceutical Promotion drugs in the therapeutic class had a negative and significant effect on DTCA outlays. In addition, the In this section, we review the empirical studies of coefficient for generic entry was large, negative and determinants of pharmaceutical promotional spendstatistically significant. These findings are consising. DTCA of prescription drugs has only constituttent with the Dorfman-Steiner theorem, which ed a significant portion of pharmaceutical promopredicts lower advertising-to-sales ratios in more tional spending since the mid-1990s; [21] therefore, competitive markets where demand is more price earlier studies focused exclusively on promotion to elastic. Iizuka [9] examined the impact of productphysicians.
level generic entry but not generic entry elsewhere Hurwitz and Caves [7] studied the determinants of in the class as a whole or among close competitors, pharmaceutical promotional spending in a study of on an individual firm's DTCA outlays. 150 products from 29 multisource drug markets (in which both brand name and generic equivalents
In one of the only analyses of the effect of were sold) between 1978 and 1983. Promotional generic entry on a competitor's promotional spendspending included detailing, journal advertising and ing, Berndt et al. [10] examined changes in detailing direct-mail advertising. They examined the impact minutes and pages of journal advertising associated of a number of structural and competitive factors on with Zantac ® (an H2-histamine receptor antagonist product-specific advertising-to-sales ratios. Their [H2-blocker] used to treat acid reflux) losing patent cross-sectional regressions showed that the number protection in the late 1990s. In the months leading of years since the first generic competitors entered up to the patent expiration date of Zantac ® and in the the market had the largest impact on a brand name months afterward, the manufacturers of Axid ® and drug's advertising-to-sales ratio. Caves et al. [8] Pepcid ® (two other H2-blockers that had not yet lost examined branded and generic drug prices, market patent protection) decreased detailing for their prodshares, quantities sold and brand advertising (de-ucts. Journal advertising increased for Pepcid ® in fined as detailing and journal advertising) for a the months before Zantac ® generic entry and panel of 30 drugs that lost patent protection between dropped afterward, while journal advertising for Ax-1976 and 1987 . They found that generic entry had a id ® dropped before Zantac ® generic entry and connegative impact on advertising expenditures, with tinued to drop afterwards. The case of the H2-blockadvertising outlays falling during the 2 years prior to ers is somewhat unique because the H 2 market was generic entry. Branded advertising fell 20% with already in decline.
2 Hence, during the period that the entry of the first generic, an additional 40% when H2-blockers began losing patent protection, the rethe number of generic entrants reached five, and an sults are difficult to interpret in light of the theory set additional 20% when the number of generic compet-out above. [11] Generic entry [27] New indication [11] New formulation entry [11] While most studies have focused on the potential gests that generic competition has large effects on for advertising to affect demand for a given drug, demand elasticities, whereas therapeutic competiEllison and Ellison [23] hypothesized that advertising tion has more modest demand-response effects. We and new product formulation introduction might therefore expect own-generic entry to have much also be used as tools to deter generic entry, partic-stronger impacts on promotional outlays than entry ularly in medium-sized markets (in very large and by other brands. very small markets, deterring generic entry was unlikely or unnecessary, respectively). Using a pan-
The Selective Serotonin Reuptake el of drugs that lost patent protection between 1986
Inhibitor Market and 1992, they reported some empirical evidence suggesting that incumbents in medium-sized marSSRIs are medications commonly used to treat kets facing generic entry were more likely than depression. The first SSRI, Prozac ® , received FDA incumbents in similarly sized markets not facing approval in 1987. Zoloft ® , the second SSRI apentry to decrease detailing expenditures. Those fac-proved by the FDA, entered the market in 1991. ing generic entry were also more likely to introduce Paxil ® entered the market in 1992 and Celexa ® in reformulations as patent expiration approached.
1998. A fifth SSRI, Luvox ® , received FDA approval in December 1994 to treat obsessive compulsive Thus, the few studies that have examined the disorder only. Although an SSRI, Luvox ® was nevdeterminants of pharmaceutical promotional spender approved for the treatment of depression and was ing directed at physicians and consumers have conthus excluded from our analysis. sistently found time left on patent and generic entry Prozac ® was the first SSRI to lose patent protecto have strong negative effects on own product tion (table I) . The Prozac ® patent expired in August promotion, a finding that is consistent with the Dorf-2001 and generic fluoxetine products entered at that man-Steiner theorem. It is reasonable to expect that time. Generic entry followed for Paxil ® in June the price elasticity is greater in absolute value for 2003, Celexa ® in October 2004 and Zoloft ® in June drugs that have generic substitutes because manda-2006. tory substitution policies, tiered formularies and other financial incentives that favour generics induce New product formulations of three of the four demand for the generic versions of these molecules. SSRIs indicated for the treatment of depression However, the studies of pharmaceutical promotion have been introduced over the past several years reviewed above do not examine the impact of gener- (table I) slightly shorter onset of action than Celexa ® . [28] Moreover, manufacturers of three of the four As noted above, we estimated multivariate reSSRIs initially approved for the treatment of depresgression models of the logarithm of expenditures for sion have sought and obtained FDA approval to each SSRI and promotional type combination (e.g. market the drugs for additional indications, includCelexa ® total promotional expenditures, Celexa ® ing panic disorder, GAD, premenstrual dysphoric detailing expenditures). We estimated two specificadisorder (PMDD) and post-traumatic stress disorder tions for these models, which differ based on the (PTSD). [11] Two of the four drugs (Paxil ® in May treatment of generic entry. In the first specification 1999 and Zoloft ® in February 2003) received FDA we included a dummy variable that equalled one if approval for social anxiety disorder (SAD), an ill-the drug had lost patent protection and zero otherness for which diagnosis and treatment are some-wise. In the second specification, we used two variwhat controversial. [29] ables to measure the effects of generic entry. First, each model included a variable controlling for the number of quarters until patent expiration for the Data and Methods molecule. This variable equals one divided by the number of quarters until expiration (1/Nq) and one We examined factors affecting promotional for all quarters after patent expiration (therefore, its spending for the four molecules in the SSRI class maximum value was constrained to one). We hythat are indicated for the treatment of depression: pothesized that, as patent expiration approached, Prozac ® , Paxil ® , Zoloft ® and Celexa ® . We em-promotional spending would decrease, which would result in a negative coefficient for this variable. ployed quarterly data on product-level promotional
Recognizing the pre/post-patent expiration asymmespending over the period 1997-2004. DTCA expentry, we controlled for the number of quarters since diture data were obtained from TNS Media Intellithe molecule's patent expired in the Paxil ® and gence, (formerly Competitive Media Reporting) Prozac ® models. This variable equals zero for all New York, NY, USA, physician detailing expendiquarters before patent expiration, one in the quarter ture data were obtained from Verispan, Yardley, of patent expiry, and is a counter variable thereafter. PA, and data on the retail value of free samples were Because the Celexa ® patent expired in the last quarobtained from IMS Health, Norwalk, CT, USA.
ter of our study period, we did not add this variable We specified and estimated two types of empiri-to the Celexa ® models. Zoloft ® remained on patent cal models of promotion. First, we estimated drug-throughout our study period, so the Zoloft ® models do not contain this variable. specific models of total quarterly promotional exTo explore the effects of generic entry by a penditures (DTCA, detailing and sampling comcompetitor, in both specifications we included dumbined) and detailing expenditures alone. Second, we my variables indicating whether generic entry by a estimated a pooled (across drug products over time) particular competitor molecule had occurred. For logit model of the likelihood of any DTCA expendiexample, the Paxil ® models included a dummy varitures in a given quarter. Unlike detailing expendiable indicating whether generic entry by fluoxetine tures, which are consistently non-zero from quarter had occurred; the Celexa ® models included the to quarter, DTCA expenditures can be highly varia-same variable, as well as a dummy variable indicatble over time. As a result, we estimated the ing whether generic entry by paroxetine had ocprobability of any DTCA expenditures in a quarter curred. The Prozac ® models do not include the rather than the level of spending. We do not estimate paroxetine entry variable because paroxetine enseparate models for sampling expenditures because tered the market almost 2 years after Prozac ® lost its of the high correlation between detailing and sam-patent, and at that time there was very little promopling spending.
tional spending for Prozac ® .
Models also included dummy variables indicat-
Probability of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTCA) Spending Model ing whether a reformulated product using the same molecule had been launched. Thus, the Prozac ® As noted above, because manufacturers' DTCA models included a dummy variable for entry of expenditures are highly variable compared with Prozac Weekly ® , the Celexa ® models included a those for detailing (i.e. a drug may have high DTCA dummy variable for Lexapro ® entry, and the Paxil ® spending in one month and none in the next), we models included a dummy variable for Paxil CR ® estimated a pooled logit model of the probability of entry. Finally, the models also included dummy any DTCA spending in a given quarter. The unit of variables representing whether the drug had re-observation was a drug-quarter. The model included ceived FDA approval for indications other than de-as explanatory variables the time to patent expirapression. We focused on two indications, GAD and tion variable used in the models of promotional SAD, that were likely to represent sizeable markets expenditures as well as a dummy variable indicating for SSRIs because of the prevalence of these condi-whether a new formulation of the molecule had tions. [30] The Zoloft ® models contained a variable entered and a variable indicating the order of entry indicating approval of an indication for SAD, while for the molecule (e.g. for Prozac ® , equals '1' since the Paxil ® models contained variables for approval Prozac ® was the first to be approved by the FDA; of an indication for SAD and for GAD. We hypothe-for Zoloft ® , equals '2' since Zoloft ® was the sized that the GAD indication would be associated second, and so on). The model also included a with increased detailing expenditures because of the dummy variable indicating whether the molecule prevalence of GAD, particularly among patients had received FDA approval for an indication to treat seen in primary care settings. We hypothesized that SAD, and a time counter variable named 'Quarter'. the SAD indication would be associated with in-
In all these models we assumed that generic creased DTCA expenditures, since manufacturers entry, which we postulate is largely beyond the wished to convey the availability of a treatment for control of the branded drug manufacturer, is exogethis previously unapproved indication.
nous to manufacturer decisions about promotional spending. As a result, we interpret the coefficients Because we were concerned about the possibility on the generic entry variables as representing causal of partial adjustment in promotional spending over effects. By contrast, the decision to introduce a time, since media promotion contracts are frequentreformulated product is jointly determined along ly longer than one quarter, we estimated partial with promotional spending decisions. In examining adjustment models of the logarithm of expenditures coefficients on the reformulation entry variables, we for each drug and promotion combination. This inlook for a partial correlation that is consistent with volved including an explanatory variable for the the Dorfman-Steiner theorem described above, rathlagged value of the dependent variable to the models er than a causal relationship. We hypothesize that described above. The coefficient on the lagged exmanufacturer promotional spending on the original penditure variable was statistically significant only product will drop substantially after the introduction in the partial adjustment model of Paxil ® detailing of a product reformulation, as the manufacturer atexpenditures, so we selected a model with contem-tempts to shift demand from the originator brand poraneous spending as the dependent variable (i.e. product (which has limited time left on patent) onto the logarithm of quarterly spending at time t) for the the reformulation. expenditure analyses. The partial adjustment model results for Paxil ® promotional expenditures were Results implausible (i.e. a negative adjustment of promotional spending) so we do not present these results.
Over the period 1997-2004, there was consideraWe also tested for the presence of autocorrelation ble variation in the composition of promotional exusing Durbin's m statistic. In all models but one (the penditures across the four products. Prozac ® and model of Paxil ® detailing expenditures), we could Zoloft ® , the first two entrants, followed similar not reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. strategies. The manufacturers of each spent approxi-mately four times more on physician detailing than duced just 5 months before generic entry for they spent on DTCA over this period. DTCA expen-Prozac ® , and promotional spending for the originaditures were approximately 8% of total promotional tor drug remained fairly high at the time of generic spending for both drugs, while detailing expendi-entry, after which it dropped off. By contrast, protures were 30% for Prozac ® and 27% for Zoloft ® . motional spending for Paxil ® dropped off to a very Note that the estimated share spent on free samples low level when Paxil CR ® was introduced over a (62% for Prozac ® and 65% for Zoloft ® ) is likely an year before generic entry of paroxetine. overestimate of promotion costs to the manufacturer For both specifications, in most cases generic since IMS Health estimates this promotion cost as entry by a competitor did not have a significant equalling the retail value of free samples, computed effect on promotional spending. The coefficients on as the average wholesale (list) price (for more dis-these variables were statistically significant only for cussion of this issue see Berndt). [31] Paxil ® , the third total promotional spending for Zoloft ® (the only entrant, devoted a larger share of its promotional product that did not experience generic entry during expenditures to DTCA. The manufacturer of Paxil ® our study period): entry of generic fluoxetine had a spent less than twice as much on detailing as on positive effect, while generic entry of paroxetine DTCA. Celexa ® , the last entrant, employed no DT-had a negative effect. CA, focusing instead on detailing and free samples.
New Product Formulations, New Indication
As seen in figure 1(a-c) , detailing expenditures
Approval and Total Promotion and
for the originator products Prozac ® , Paxil ® and
Detailing Expenditures
Celexa ® dropped dramatically when a reformulation of the molecule was introduced (there were no refor-
The entry of a new product formulation for Paxmulations of Zoloft ® ). For Paxil ® and Celexa ® , il ® was associated with a lower level of detailing promotional detailing expenditures had virtually spending for the original product (and a lower level stopped by the time of generic entry for these moleof total promotional spending in the table II specificules (15 and 27 months after new formulation cation only). The entry of a new product formulation entry, respectively).
for Celexa ® was associated with a lower level of both detailing and total promotional spending for the
Generic Entry and Total Promotion and
original product, although the coefficient for the
Detailing Expenditures
Lexapro ® variable only approached significance in In the initial specification of the models of pro-the Celexa ® models (p = 0.06 or 0.07, tables II and motional spending (table II) , we found that own-III). The coefficient on the variable indicating apgeneric entry had a large negative effect on detailing proval for a SAD indication was not statistically and total promotional spending for Prozac ® and on significant in the detailing models for either Paxil ® total promotional spending for Paxil ® . The co-or Zoloft ® but was significant for total promotion of efficient on the own-generic entry variable for Pax-Paxil ® (tables II and III). For Paxil ® , the only SSRI il ® detailing was negative but small relative to other with a GAD indication, the coefficient on the GAD coefficients in the model and not statistically signif-indication variable was positive and statistically sigicant. In the second specification (table III) , we nificant for detailing expenditures (tables II and III). found that the time to patent expiration variable was negative and statistically significant for detailing The coefficient on the variable indicating the The results of the pooled logit model of DTCA number of quarters since patent expiration, included spending in a quarter (table IV) suggest that the in the Prozac ® and Paxil ® models only, was nega-probability of any DTCA expenditures decreases as tive and statistically significant only in the detailing patent expiration nears, although this coefficient and total expenditure models for Prozac ® . A refor-estimate was not statistically significant. The presmulation of Prozac ® (Prozac Weekly ® ) was intro-ence of a product reformulation is associated with a .001 a A dummy variable was included that equalled one if the drug had lost patent protection, and zero otherwise. GAD = generalized anxiety disorder; SAD = social anxiety disorder; SE = standard error.
significantly lower likelihood of DTCA for the orig-drug, with changes occurring with own-generic eninal brand. In fact, figure 1 (a-c) shows that detail-try, reformulation entry and new indications. ing expenditures drop precipitously after entry of a Promotional spending (both total and detailing reformulated product, suggesting a shift in the pro-alone) is generally lower after own-generic entry motional strategy. than before, a finding consistent with the Dorfman-FDA approval for a SAD indication is associated Steiner theorem and other empirical literature, alwith a substantially greater likelihood of DTCA though the impact of generic entry has become more expenditures. Order of entry has a negative, statisti-subtle in the wake of regulatory changes permitting cally significant effect on probability of DTCA extension of marketing exclusivity. Promotional exspending, which is consistent with previous findings penditures generally dropped as patent expiration that earlier entrants are more likely to advertise approached for the drugs that lost patent protection directly to consumers. [9] Finally, the time trend vari-during our study period. able 'quarter' is positive and significant, suggesting
The introduction of a new product formulation a small increase in the likelihood of any DTCA appears to be a common strategy for attempting to spending over the time period.
extend market exclusivity for medications facing impending generic entry. Because the Hatch-WaxDiscussion man Act allows for an additional 3 years of market exclusivity for a new formulation, manufacturers SSRI manufacturers spend substantial amounts have an incentive to shift demand for the original promoting their products through the use of DTCA, formulation of a brand drug that will soon lose detailing, free samples and other strategies. The patent protection onto a reformulation of the drug. amount and composition of promotional spending
The manufacturers of Paxil ® and Celexa ® shifted differs both across SSRIs and over time for a given almost all promotion dollars from the original brand One reason could be that Eli Lilly may have expected to win a patent litigation case that would have to the new formulation (Paxil CR ® and Lexapro ® , delayed patent expiration beyond the actual expirarespectively) when the new formulation was introtion date of August 2001. [32] Eli Lilly's detailing and duced. In both cases, the reformulation was intro-DTCA contracts may have been fixed in the shortduced long before generic entry (15 months before term and non-cancellable immediately after generic paroxetine's entry for Paxil CR ® and 27 months entry. Also, Prozac ® was the first SSRI to lose before citalopram's entry for Lexapro ® ), which is patent protection, and the past 6 years have likely consistent with the hypothesis that manufacturers generated considerable experimentation and learnattempted to shift demand for the original brand ing in the marketing of antidepressants. onto the new formulation in advance of generic entry. Eli Lilly released Prozac Weekly ® , the first It is clear that the manufacturers of these products SSRI reformulation to enter the market, just faced a trade-off between lost profits today from 5 months before generic entry of fluoxetine. Promo-brand cannibalization versus increased profits totional spending for Prozac ® decreased somewhat morrow stemming from brand protection. Our emgradually in the months after patent expiration rather pirical work can offer some insights into the optimal than stopping more abruptly once the reformulated timing of the launch of a reformulated product, viewed from the manufacturer's perspective (not product entered or right before patent expiration. .001 a Two variables were used to measure the effects of generic entry, as described in the Methods section. GAD = generalized anxiety disorder; NA = not applicable; SAD = social anxiety disorder; SE = standard error.
It is important to place our findings into the context of what is known about the welfare effects of pharmaceutical promotion for antidepressant medications. Most studies that shed light on this issue focus only on DTCA as opposed to other types of promotional spending (e.g., detailing, free samples provided to physicians, journal advertising). Donohue et al. [33] found that DTCA for antidepres- sants results in increased antidepressant prescribing. Donohue and Berndt [34] found that DTCA has little necessarily the consumer's). Future work should effect on the choice of a specific antidepressant examine manufacturer strategies regarding the tim-among individuals who initiated antidepressant ing of new product formulation entry relative to the treatment, although detailing does have an important originator brand's patent expiration, recognising effect on medication choice. that the observed effect of generic entry on promo-
The evidence on the effect of promotion, and tional spending is conditional on a particular refor-patient requests stemming from those promotions, mulation introduction strategy pursued by manufac-on the appropriateness of antidepressant use is mixturers.
ed. Donohue et al. [33] found that DTCA expenditures Receiving FDA approval to market a drug for a were associated with a small increase in appropriate new clinical indication may represent another way duration of antidepressant use among individuals for a brand manufacturer to extend market exclusivi-diagnosed with depression who initiated antidepresty for their product. The results for the SAD and sant therapy. Kravitz et al. [35] found that standard-GAD indications suggest that manufacturers may ized patients (actors following strict protocol for target a particular type of promotion for a given presenting their condition) who presented with indication. The manufacturer of Paxil ® increased symptoms of major depression were more likely to detailing expenditures for Paxil ® after receiving receive appropriate medications if they made a re-FDA approval to market the drug for GAD, but did quest either for any antidepressant or one that they not appear to change its use of DTCA for Paxil ® had seen advertised (e.g. Paxil ® ) than if they made (data not shown). This suggests that the primary no medication request. To the extent that DTCA promotional target for GAD, a condition seen often results in patients requesting medication from their in both primary care and specialty mental health doctors, this suggests that DTCA may result in more settings, may have been physicians instead of conappropriate treatment for major depression for some sumers. In contrast, FDA approval to market Paxil ® patients. However, the study also found that patients and Zoloft ® for SAD did not affect the manufacturwho presented with symptoms of adjustment disorers' detailing expenditures but did result in a greater der with depressed mood (a condition for which likelihood of using DTCA in a given quarter, as there is no consensus supporting antidepressant use) shown in table IV. This result suggests that the and who made general or DTCA-related requests for primary target for promotion of the drugs as treatan antidepressant were also more likely to receive an ments for SAD may have been consumers rather antidepressant than those who made no requests and than physicians, with manufacturers perhaps hoping merely presented with symptoms. Thus, DTCA may to convince consumers that social anxiety is a treataalleviate problems with underuse of antidepressants ble clinical condition. A complementary explanabut could result in increased utilization of these tion may be that Paxil ® was the first drug to receive medications for conditions for which there is no an FDA indication approval for SAD. Therefore, its clinical consensus on the appropriateness of treatmanufacturer needed to convince patients to ask ment. Thus, the net welfare effects of increased their doctors for the medication but did not have a promotional spending for antidepressants are unneed to persuade doctors that its drug was the best to clear. treat that condition.
There are several limitations to our work. First, laries or be more willing to grant prior authorization or formulary exceptions for the reformulations. findings from the antidepressant market may not apply to other therapeutic categories. Second, when Conclusions time series analysis is employed, it can be difficult to distinguish effects of multiple events occurring Pharmaceutical manufacturers have developed a approximately simultaneously. Third, there may be number of strategies for extending their effective partial adjustment of Paxil ® detailing expenditures patent life that have important effects on promotionthat we do not account for with our specification. al spending. Given the significant impact pharmaThat is, if the manufacturer responded slowly to ceutical promotion has on prescription drug spendmarket conditions, the response may only be visible ing and public health, it is important to gain an over time. Fourth, we ignored price in these models understanding and appropriate interpretation of because we lacked data on transactions prices. Man-these relationships. This study provides an imporufacturers seeking to maximize profits have several tant first look at how the promotional strategies of instruments available to affect profits, including branded SSRI manufacturers are affected by generic promotion, new product formulations, new clinical competition by a competitor in the same class, by indications and pricing. Fifth, our analyses of total new product formulations, and by new clinical indipromotional spending did not include data on jour-cations. nal advertising expenditures. However, journal advertising expenditures for SSRIs and SNRIs repreAcknowledgements sented a very small share (0.4%) of total promotion- attempt to maintain revenues after generic entry, Ernst Berndt has testified as an expert witness on behalf of Eli albeit at a lower level. The release of an authorized Lilly in litigation involving atypical antipsychotics. generic is likely to affect the promotional strategy of
